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Did You Say “Social Impact”? 
Welfare Transformations, Networks of Expertise, 
and the Financialization of Italian Welfare 
Davide Caselli ∗ 
Abstract: »Haben Sie ,social impact‘ gesagt? Wohlfahrtstransformationen, Kom-
petenznetzwerke und die Finanzialisierung der italienischen Wohlfahrt«. The arti-
cle contributes to research on the role of expertise in shaping the transfor-
mations of welfare states. Looking at the Italian welfare state as a case study, it 
analyses the different networks of expertise that have developed along the 
transformations of Italian welfare in the last 30 years: from the rise of Welfare 
Mix (a combination of quasi-market of social services and participatory social 
planning at the local scale) in the 1990s, up to its crisis, and through the cur-
rent tendency toward its financialization. The article analyses the diffusion of 
the discourse and practice of Social Impact Investing (SII) in Italy and, in par-
ticular, it focuses on the elaboration of a new measurement tool aimed at 
measuring the “social impact” of non-profit organizations. In doing so, the arti-
cle shows that different networks of expertise, developed in different phases of 
welfare transformations, co-exist and converge on the idea that “social impact 
matters,” but differ and conflict around how “social impact” should be defined 
and measured. The prevailing of a network rooted in the Welfare Mix has 
slowed the penetration of SII, but also reinforced the fragmentation of the 
field. 
Keywords: Financialization, expertise, welfare state, social impact, metrics, wel-
fare state transformation, Italy. 
1. Introduction 
The present article examines the role of expertise in the transformation of the 
welfare state in Italy, with particular focus on the sector of social assistance and 
on the current tendency toward its financialization. The article contributes to 
the debate in three respects. First, by means of an overview of the three-decade 
transformation of Italian welfare state, it offers an account of the historical 
trajectory which provided a context in which the discourse, the infrastructure, 
and the practice of Social Impact Investing (SII) could develop, i.e., the ecolog-
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ical conditions for the emergence of the expertise on financialization of Wel-
fare. Second, focusing on the process of elaboration of a specific tool for as-
sessing the social impact of Italian social enterprises, the article accounts for 
the conflicts and negotiations that such processes may engender in the field of 
welfare expertise and it therefore contributes to the understanding of the social 
dimension of metrics and measures (Barman 2015; Chiapello and Godefroy 
2017). Third, by showing the articulation of the Italian impact economy in-
volved in the elaboration of tools for social impact measurement, it shows the 
coherence of the Italian case with other national contexts characterised by 
fragmentation of impact metrics (ibid.). 
The argument will be presented following a chronological periodization 
based on three phases: the rise of Welfare Mix (1991-2007), its crisis (2008-
2013), and its financialization (from 2014-2019; see Tab.1). The periodisation 
is not meant to suggest a linear evolution according to which, decade after 
decade, existing social policy configurations are substituted by new ones ex-
pressing and/or instituting different structures. What is rather at stake is 1) to 
account for the tentative and contradictory transition from one arrangement to 
the other, where the heritage of previous models shapes the way the new ones 
work and 2) to show the role of expertise in these transitions. 
A clarification is needed about the terms financialization and expertise. 
First, following Gerald A. Epstein’s comprehensive study of financialization in 
international political economy (Epstein 2005, 3), I qualify the financialization 
of welfare as the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, finan-
cial actors, and financial institutions within contemporary welfare systems and 
I consider the promotion of SII in Italy as part of the tendency toward the fi-
nancialization of national welfare state.1 Second, this article conceptualizes 
expertise as a “network connecting not only the putative experts but also other 
actors, including clients and patients, devices and instruments, concepts, and 
institutional and spatial arrangements” (Eyal 2013, 873). Elaborated by Gil 
Eyal in his proposal for a “sociology of expertise,” this definition builds on 
Foucaultian and Actor-Network categories to highlight the ecological condi-
tions, networks, and mechanisms that allow specific problems and tasks to 
emerge and become acknowledged as objects of expert intervention. This ap-
proach regards expert statements and performances as “historical events,” 
whose conditions of possibility must be interrogated. These conditions of pos-
sibility depend upon strategies of generosity and co-production of professional 
and non-professional actors of the field, partially blurring the boundary be-
tween the two. Moreover, expertise does not only designate a number of hu-
man, individual or collective, actors but also concepts, tools, and devices 
through which problems and tasks can be conceived, formulated, and per-
 
1  For a more articulated discussion of this interpretation, see Caselli and Rucco 2018 and 
Casell and Dagnes 2018. For an opposite perspective, see Pasi (ed.) 2017. 
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formed. As a consequence, the study of expertise needs to focus on the net-
works and alliances between different actors and to pay attention to the cogni-
tive processes and the technical tools that participate to the process. As Eyal 
writes, “this complex make-up of expertise is typically much more evident 
when it is still “in the making” and alternative devices, actors, concepts, and 
arrangements are still viable candidates for formulating the problem or address-
ing it” (ibid., 871). Once institutionalised and black-boxed, expertise acquires a 
neutral and natural appearance that leaves in the shadow the complex mecha-
nisms that allowed its formation, and which determine the way in which it 
operates.  
Eyal’s approach shares an important feature with the sociological/academic 
literature on SII and financialization of welfare, which attributes major im-
portance to the work of a coalition of experts and consultants investing their 
professional skills in the long-term transformation of the non-profit sector 
along the lines of the for-profit sector and in the financialization of public 
policies (Barman 2016; Morley 2016; Williams 2017; Chiapello 2019). Build-
ing on the history and sociology of accounting, financialization scholars em-
phasize the link between funding circuits and mechanisms on the one hand and 
specific forms of accounting and measurement on the other. In this view, ex-
pertise is crucial for the “work of financialization”: the manipulation and re-
structuring of values, ideas, and practices of a specific social realm and their 
reconfiguration into new cognitive and operational frames, consistent with the 
values and interests of financial investors (Barman 2015; Chiapello and Gode-
froy 2017; Williams 2017; Chiapello 2019). This activity results in a tension 
between convergence on shared conceptions and tools among the different 
actors of a field and complex and uncertain power relations, tensions, and con-
flicts in which experts and expertise are involved (Eyal 2013; Williams 2017). 
This tension may lead to the dominance of economic and financial values in 
sectors which were before governed by different value or to the formation of 
“concerned markets” (Geiger et al. 2014), i.e., markets incorporating different 
kinds of value (in the case of Welfare and SII: financial and social value), 
based on a “compromise” between the different values and logics (Barman 
2015). 
The elaboration of social impact metrics will be regarded as an example of 
the formulation of new problems and tasks, entailing the building of a network 
of human and non-human actors, i.e., as an example of expertise in-the-making. 
The article will capture the dynamic dimension of this formulation by showing 
that different and alternative networks of expertise formulated different prob-
lems and tasks and conflicted for being recognized as legitimate policy actors. 
The article draws upon three types of sources: 1) observations and field-
notes of public and semi-public debates and meetings organised by public and 
private institutions from 2013 to 2017 on the restructuring of Italian welfare; 2) 
the analysis of official documents and websites of major funding and consult-
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ing institutions involved in this debate, including scientific, semi-scientific 
writings (non-academic research reports, papers, and position papers) and non-
scientific pieces (newsletter articles and public statements by stakeholders, as 
well as policy-oriented reports and recommendations); 3) Twenty in-depth 
interviews with researchers and heads of public and private consulting institu-
tions, closely involved in local and national debate son the restructuring of 
welfare.2 
2. Taking a Step Back: The Rise and Crisis of the Welfare 
Mix, Or, the Ground for the Financialization of Welfare 
This section is aimed at providing an historical perspective on the evolution of 
the role of expertise in the evolution of the Italian welfare state, especially in 
the field of local welfare, as shown in Table 1.3 
Table 1: Co-Evolution of Welfare Mix Services and Expertise in Italy 
 1991-2007 2008-2013 2014-2019 
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driven privatisation + 
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Trend in Public 
Funding 
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2  The interviewees have been selected according to positional and reputational criteria: after 
a first round of interviews to researchers involved in the evaluation of local social innova-
tion programs, a second and a third round of interviews took place with professionals iden-
tified by the first-round interviewees and by myself according to their position in the most 
cited and most active research and consulting institutions nation-wide. 
3  Each period, and the first one especially, is very complex and articulated. For accurate 
discussion of each period, see Sections 1 and 2. The representation of the period 2014-2019, 
involving the most recent developments, is clearly the more tentative and prospective. 
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 1991-2007 2008-2013 2014-2019 
Welfare expertise 
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Object of Public 
Mechanisms of 
Control 
Financial reporting + 
process/quality 
reporting 
Financial reporting + 
process/ quality 
reporting 
Financial reporting + 
process/ quality re-
porting + social im-
pact measurement 
2.1 1991-2007: “Empowering the Clients.” The Rise of the Welfare Mix 
According to the comparative literature in sociology and political science, the 
Italian welfare state fits into the South-European welfare model, characterised 
by a mixed paradigm based on universalism in education and healthcare, corpo-
ratism in the pension system, and unemployment policies and a poor develop-
ment of social assistance (Ferrera 1996; Ascoli and Pavolini 2015). Since the 
1990s, it has undergone major transformations, in line with a European trend of 
welfare crisis and welfare reforms. Different waves of reform have acted on 
almost all welfare sectors, from pensions to healthcare, from education to labor 
market and social assistance, following a path of welfare retrenchment and 
expanding role of the non-profit organizations (NPOs) in planning and deliver-
ing social policies (Ascoli and Pavolini 2015). The momentum of welfare re-
forms was attained in the year 2000 with the Law 328/00, the first comprehen-
sive legislation on social assistance since 1890. The law institutionalized a 
welfare mix system, based upon the combination of a quasi-market of social 
services and a system of participatory social planning at the local scale (Evers 
and Svetlink 1993; Ascoli and Ranci 2002).  
Quasi-markets are markets where “the provision of a service is undertaken 
by competitive providers as in pure markets, but where the purchasers of the 
service are financed from resources provided by the State instead of from their 
own private resources” (Le Grand 2002, 80). To be more precise, the compet-
ing providers often include NPOs, the resources may be “centralised in a pur-
chasing agency or allocated to users in the form of vouchers rather than cash,” 
and the purchaser does not necessarily act in the market personally, but may be 
represented by agents (such as care managers; Le Grand and Bartlett 1993, 10). 
The law 328/00 introduced the quasi-market of social services through the split 
between the financing of social services (covered 80% by the local administra-
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tions and 20% by the central state) and their production and delivery (operated 
by private, mostly non-profit actors). Such division of functions has been regu-
lated by the State and mainly implemented through the practice of sub-
contracting and accrediting, according to a pattern of supply-driven privatiza-
tion (Ascoli and Ranci 2002; Burgalassi and Melchiorre 2014; Bifulco 2015). 
In this context, the non-profit sector emerged as the key actor of the welfare 
system, supported by the State and, to a minor extent, by Foundations of Bank-
ing Origin (FBOs), a hybrid actor developed in the ’90s out of the privatization 
of Italy’s public banking sector (Cerri 2003; Marcon 2004; Barbetta 2013). 
Beside this quasi-market, the law 328/00 introduced an important shift in the 
governance of local welfare, namely the Piano di Zona (Zone Planning), a form 
of participatory social planning gathering the main public and private actors 
with the aim of defining the strategies for local welfare systems. 
Within such institutional arrangement, from 2000 onwards, both local gov-
ernment and non-profit organizations faced new problems and required new 
tasks to be performed. This offered the context – in Eyal’s terms, the ecological 
conditions – for the development of two networks of expertise operating in the 
overlapping fields of local governance and non-profit development.  
More specifically, the first network was characterised by the activity of 
small- and medium-size consulting institutions, commissioned by the public 
administration, FBOs, and NPOs. It developed by helping local governments in 
new functions such as regulating the quasi-market, coordinating the participa-
tory processes of the Piano di Zona, building and evaluating new programs to 
be realized by non-profits, and contributing to planning and evaluation of social 
programs and projects. At the same time, they were often commissioned by 
NPOs for supporting them in dealing with the increasingly complicated bidding 
mechanisms and accounting systems imposed by national and European public 
institutions and FBOs, in monitoring complex multi-year projects, and in man-
aging fast and complex organizational growth. Moreover, NPOs also had to 
learn to formulate and implement more and more articulated projects, and to 
train their staff according to fast-changing policy ideas and institutionalized 
professional skills. Therefore, this network derived legitimacy from its ability 
to cope with the high degree of openness of the policy process (from govern-
ment to governance logic) and its complexity (integration of different policy 
sectors, actors, and scales) and functions such as coordination, evaluation and 
following up became crucial (ibid.). As a consequence, techniques and tools 
such as action-research, research-training and evaluation became crucial for the 
development of the system. Evaluation, in particular, developed with the aim of 
supporting processes of learning-by-experience on behalf of social workers and 
organizations, building shared visions among the different stakeholders of local 
welfare systems, and defining and monitoring the quality of sub-contracted 
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social work (De Ambrogio and Sordelli 2014).4 This network of expertise was 
rooted in the disciplinary area of psycho-sociology (Barus-Michel et al. 2013) 
and it was inspired by the model of “process consultation” (Schein 1969). 
According to this approach, based on a mix of soft (processual) and hard (sec-
torial) competencies, experts are meant to help clients to better define the prob-
lem they need to solve, to reach a shared view of its solution and to monitor the 
actions undertaken for putting the solution in practice, rather than to possess 
definitive knowledge on particular issues and give straightforward and stand-
ardized responses (De Ambrogio and Sordelli 2014). In the words of the head 
of one of the dominant welfare consulting institutions: 
Welfare used to be characterized by the interaction, on the one hand, between 
“the poor” asking for help and the social worker delivering the service, and on 
the other hand, between the policy maker looking for certain knowledge or da-
ta, and the consultant providing it. Now it is less and less the case. Both social 
workers and consultants work for the empowerment of their clients. (Inter-
view, June 2014)  
Within this context, a second network of expertise developed with the more 
specific aim of supporting NPOs in playing their increasingly central role in the 
planning and implementation of social policies. It was promoted by partner-
ships between NPOs, FBOs, and academic research centers, mostly based in 
departments of economics, and it was dominated by economists, Law profes-
sors, and economic sociologists devoted to the study and the promotion of 
cooperative economy according to the perspective of “civil economy” (Bruni 
and Zamagni 2017). This network played a crucial role in supporting NPOs 
evolution both at the macro and micro level: at the macro level, it developed 
comparative international research on the cooperative economy and played an 
important consulting role for the EU institutions; at the micro-level it offered 
business planning, consulting, and training services for NPOs and non-profit 
second level organizations (Euricse 2010).  
Together, these two networks allowed the welfare mix to emerge and con-
solidate through the combination of quasi-market and local social planning in 
an incremental, two-decade, process.  
 
4  From the 1990s onwards, in line with a European trends, public policy evaluation becomes a 
key element of the modernization of Public Administration and, in the field of Welfare, it 
has been included in almost all programs and projects funded by public and private institu-
tions. The quantitative and qualitative relevance that this emerging professional group was 
gaining is witnessed by the establishment, in 1997, of the Italian Association of Evaluation 
(AIV). 
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2.2  2008-2013: “The Planner Defines the Object and the Process.” 
The Welfare Mix in Crisis 
Since 2008, the welfare mix system has been subject to budget cuts and re-
regulation, in a context of dramatic fiscal and political crisis. Austerity 
measures were implemented by governments following a European Commis-
sion agenda, including cuts to social services and the recentralization of finan-
cial responsibility from the local to the central state (Burgalassi and Melchiorre 
2014; Conferenza delle Regioni e delle Province autonome 2014; Polizzi and 
Tajani 2015; Martinelli, Anttonen, and Matzke 2017). As a result, local gov-
ernments increased the outsourcing of public services to NPOs at all-time low 
bids, with many residents excluded from access to local public welfare (Gori et 
al. 2014) – even as the population living under the poverty line in Italy doubled 
(Istat 2018). Furthermore, under the pressure of growing social needs and de-
creasing financial resources, many local governments also dismissed the social 
planning promoted through Piano di Zona in favour of more immediate emer-
gency measures.  
While the welfare mix institutionalized in the early 2000s relied upon a qua-
si-market where the state purchased services from private, mainly non-profit, 
providers, and local social planning represented a new governance tool includ-
ing public and non-profit actors, a different model has emerged since 2009. 
Facing cuts in public funding for local social services, providers have started 
competing for attracting private partners while citizens have been partly trans-
formed into purchasers (Giovannetti, Gori, and Pacini 2014; Caselli 2016). 
Moreover, two issues became crucial in the debate on welfare policies: the 
need for new sources of funding for welfare policies and the need for NPOs to 
strengthen their financial autonomy from the public administration. Local gov-
ernment and private foundations started dealing with these issues using differ-
ent incentives:  
1) reforms of local welfare systems that increased the fees of public services 
and/or promoted private welfare markets (Fosti 2013). 
2) reforms of local welfare based on New Public Governance principles, 
with the State as mere facilitator of trust and networks among private ac-
tors (Osborne 2006; Pestoff, Brandsen, and Verschuere 2012; see Fosti 
2013 and Gori 2013 for the Italian context). 
3) co-funding mechanisms by which NPOs are asked to share the cost of the 
programs which they are contracted to operate (De Ambrogio and 
Guidetti 2014; Caselli 2016).  
4) local “community welfare” and “social innovation” programs, strongly 
promoting the cross-contamination of non-profit and for-profit logics and 
activity (Fondazione Cariplo 2017) 
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At the international level, the trend toward stronger entrepreneurialism by the 
non-profit sector was strengthened by the European Commission with the 
launch of the Social Business Initiative (European Commission 2011). 
These initiatives have been supported not only by economic justifications, 
but also by the re-framing of both the welfare state and the non-profit sector as 
terrains for potential win-win arrangements between for-profit and non-profit 
actors (Caselli 2016). In this perspective, private actors, especially FBOs, pro-
moted new knowledge brands, among which second welfare, i.e., the ensemble 
of non-public welfare initiatives, from philanthropy to pension funds (Maino 
and Ferrera 2013) and hybrid organizations, i.e. a new genre of enterprise 
blending capitalist and cooperative models (Venturi and Zandonai 2014) are 
the most significant.  
In this context, the networks of expertise developed during the rising phase 
of the welfare mix have suffered the cuts in national and local funding, with 
their stability undermined. In other words, the crisis of Welfare Mix precipitat-
ed a crisis in the major networks of expertise associated with it and pushed 
them to seek a re-arrangement in order to face this new situation. The first 
network, deeply rooted in the institutional structure of the welfare mix, was 
especially hit and responded with a two-fold strategy: first, defending the legit-
imacy of its financial bases, i.e., the primacy of public funding, denouncing the 
idea of NPOs being the future entrepreneurial co-funder of public policy as an 
“illusion” (De Ambrogio and Guidetti 2014). Second, seeking new allies and 
new arrangement among its actors, as the head of a major consulting firm 
states:  
A: Now we look for clients among foundations of banking origin, non-profit 
consortia or through EU projects in which we work with these [non-profit or-
ganization that are] former clients that have now become partners. […] This 
can make the whole system look a bit like Alice in Wonderland’s cricket 
match, that is a very dynamic system whose borders are really blurred… and 
you may not even have a clear attribution of the roles because the distinction 
among them is really soft. 
Q: This also means that there is no one looking at the process from the out-
side? 
A: Exactly, we are all part of a system (Interview, June 2014) 
Here, the reduction in the quantity of resources has immediate effects in quali-
ty, with increasing importance of new funding circuits (FBOs and European 
Union rather than local social policies) and with the shift in the relation be-
tween non-profits and consultancy firm “from clients to partners.” This shift in 
the nature of the relation between consultancy and third sector organizations, 
together with shrinking public funding, transforms the nature of the consultan-
cy itself: the network of expertise (a network of experts, concepts, and tech-
nical tools) is more strongly tied together. The fact that clients become partners 
and “everybody is part of the system” redefines the borders between experts 
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and other actors; overlapping, integration, and possible confusion among dif-
ferent roles seems to characterise this strategy for facing the crisis of the wel-
fare mix. 
This strategy is challenged by a different expertise, based on different ac-
tors, concepts, and devices and putting together two distinct networks. On the 
one hand, the above-mentioned expertise developed since the 1990s through 
partnerships between the non-profit sector and academic departments of eco-
nomics; on the other hand, a group of academics and professionals trained in 
urban planning and urban regeneration who have operated in experimental 
programs at the neighbourhood scale since the mid-1990s and who have been 
involved since 2008 in local social cohesion and social innovation programs 
(see above). In a context characterised by cuts to public budgets for welfare and 
demand for new funding sources and increasing financial autonomy of NPOs, 
this network challenged the dominant one in two respects. First, with respect to 
welfare paradigms and funding schemes, the new network of expertise, often 
less integrated in the welfare mix and its quasi-market arrangement, tends to 
promote the development of hybrid non-profit/for-profit models and public-
private partnerships as a natural evolution of the crisis of the welfare mix. In 
this view, urban regeneration may be the field where a more general paradigm 
shift for the innovation public policies can be experimented (Cottino and Zan-
donai 2012). 
In consequence, and contrary to the evolution of the dominant network, this 
network pursues the reinstatement of clear boundaries between experts and 
clients, with the expert taking a more authoritative and leading role. In the 
words of an influential consultant: 
I see two different roles emerging more and more clearly: on the one hand the 
planner, and on the other the organisation on the terrain. Of course, they must 
speak to each other, but they are completely different. The planner leads the 
first phase, defining the object and the process at stake. […] This is because 
projects have to work on complex representations of reality – social cohesion, 
culture, now resilience, too. And this is not the traditional approach of the 
non-profit. […] In the second phase it is the organization on the terrain lead-
ing. In this phase we limit ourselves to strategic supervision, for them not to 
lose their goal. (Interview, October 2014) 
We are far from Alice in Wonderland’s cricket match. The roles are quite clear-
ly defined and also hierarchically ordered: expert planning and design play the 
role of “elaborating complex representations of reality,” thus contributing to 
establish new frames for welfare policies and social work and to strengthen 
new networks of expertise. Top-down planning and design skills replace the 
learning by experience approach that characterised the welfare mix, while 
social workers’ technical knowledge is secondary and instrumental. 
This second network of expertise had limited impact on the welfare system 
as a whole. However, it helped to lay the foundations for broadening of the 
institutional arrangements of welfare inherited from the 1990s. In particular, 
HSR 45 (2020) 3  │  150 
the quest for new private sources of funding for social policy and the conse-
quent transformation of welfare expertise, both in terms of technical knowledge 
and in terms of the division and integration of roles with the NPOs, will con-
tinue to animate the debate on the future of Italian welfare state, as the next 
section will show. 
3.  The Financialization of the Welfare Mix (2014-2019) 
From 2014 onwards, two important initiatives developed for facing the prob-
lem of the financial sustainability of the Italian welfare state and the diversifi-
cation of funding sources of NPOs: the work of the G8 Task Force on SII and 
the national reform of the non-profit sector. As we shall see, the two initiatives 
proceeded independently, but overlapped in the effort to encourage the diffu-
sion of social impact measurement among NPOs, making social impact a new 
problem for welfare actors and social impact measurement a new key task for 
any network of expertise operating in welfare policies. 
3.1  2014-2016: “Provide Some Basic Definition for Social Impact 
Measurement.” The Emergence of the Italian Impact Economy 
The G8 Task Force on SII, launched under the British presidency in 2013, 
aimed to spread among member states the idea and the practice of SII – “har-
nessing the power of entrepreneurship, innovation and capital for the public 
good” through the implementation of a number of innovative funding schemes 
and mechanisms. The initiative convened government officials and figures 
from finance, business, and philanthropy and promoted SII as a key tool for the 
innovation of welfare systems and as a driver for the booming of a new wave 
of non-profit and for-profit “social entrepreneurship” (G8 Task Force 2014). In 
2014, the task force released a final report which emphasized the necessity for 
governments to “adapt national ecosystems to support impact investment,” and 
to adopt metrics for impact measurement to streamline “pay-for-success ar-
rangements,” i.e., privately-funded programs that subordinate the repayment 
and remuneration of the invested capital to the success of the funded program. 
Moreover, the report encouraged the establishment of “capacity building grant 
programs” in order to “boost social sector organisational capacity” for attract-
ing and managing venture capital (G8 Task Force 2015). To achieve this, the 
Task Force recommended that the Italian government: (a) provides some basic 
definition, principles, and guidelines for social impact measurement; (b) pro-
motes social impact measurement at the European level via the creation of an 
online platform including a database of “good practices”; and (c) creates a G7 
Commission for “regularly verifying member States development of the G8TF 
agenda” (ibid., 78). Therefore, SII brings together two important approaches to 
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public policy: evidence-based policy making and pay-by-result schemes. Evi-
dence-based policy-making has been promoted since the 1990s by major inter-
national policy-making actors for its alleged ability to overcome “abstract” and 
“ideological” debates about principles and goals in favor of clear quantitative 
and measurable targets and methods (OECD 2014). In this perspective, policy-
makers can learn from the results of past programs, invest in effective policies, 
and abandon ineffective ones. In the case of SII, this general frame is strength-
ened by pay-by-result schemes which pose the eventual measurable positive 
“impact” of funded programs as a crucial condition for the determination of the 
rate, if any, of capital remuneration. 
In the following years, a support coalition emerged, composed of financial 
and legal consultants with strong links to the SII academic and policy commu-
nity, private banks and foundations, foundations of banking origins, social 
cooperatives consortia, and a growing number of members of parliament. In 
January 2016, these actors founded an association named Social Impact Agen-
da for Italy with the aim of “spreading the experience of social impact invest-
ing” and “aggregate all the actors involved in the challenge of SII” (Social 
Impact Agenda 2016). As a result of such growing support for Social Impact 
Investing, the reform of non-profit sector voted by the Italian Parliament in 
May 2016, converged on the effort of the G8 task force to develop social im-
pact metrics through the introduction of two norms: 1) the instituting of a “low 
profit” regime for non-profit organizations, allowing partial remuneration of 
invested capital (Chiodo and Gerli 2017; Caselli and Rucco 2018) and 2) the 
introduction of social impact measurement as a key element for the legal 
recognition of social enterprises. The law offered a general definition of social 
impact as “the quantitative and qualitative evaluation of the short-, medium-, 
and long- term effects of the [organizations’] activities on communities, with 
respect to an explicit goal” (Law 106/2016, Articles 4 and 7). Social impact 
measurement has thus become a fundamental tool for the evolution of the Ital-
ian non-profit sector. 
As I have shown in the preceeding sections, the rising and the declining 
phases of the welfare mix emerged together with new networks of expertise, 
aimed at formulating new problems to be solved and tasks to be performed by 
the actors of the field. In particular, I showed the tensions emerging from 2008 
onwards between two networks of expertise with respect to new potential fund-
ing circuits and the hierarchical relation between experts and clients (section 
1.2). In the remainder of the article, I will show the development of a third 
network of expertise, emerging together with the tendencies to the financializa-
tion of the Italian welfare and focusing in particular on the elaboration of social 
impact metrics for Italian social enterprises. This process offers a good entry 
point for observing the evolution of the tensions originated by the crisis of the 
welfare mix. Indeed, bringing together evidence-based policy making and pay-
by-result schemes, SII seems to push for the adoption of strong quantitative and 
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standardized evaluation methods and metrics (Williams 2017), increasing the 
legitimation of evaluation tools deployed by a small number of international 
organizations based on “delocalized” forms of knowledge (Busso 2015). In this 
perspective, SII and its network of expertise seem to have the potential to fa-
vour the consolidation of the network of expertise emerging from the crisis of 
the welfare mix, based on different forms of public-private partnerships and an 
authoritative model of planning and evaluation (see section 1.2). In the next 
section, the analysis of the elaboration of social impact metrics in the Italian 
context after the reform of the non-profit approved by the Parliament in 2016 
will show more complex developments. 
3.2  2017-2019: “The Problem of Impact Measurement Does Not 
Exist.” VIS: the Italian Way towards Social Impact Evaluation 
In March 2017, in order to specify the general definition of social impact of-
fered by Law 106/2016, the Ministry of Work and Social Policy appointed a 
commission to elaborate guidelines for “social reporting and social impact 
measurement.” Before analysing its work, it is important to recall the fact that 
since 2014, the debate on social impact measurement had considerably devel-
oped in Italy due to the work of a several, quite diverse, actors: an “impact 
economy” including the different “forms of intermediation […] at play in the 
effort to create a market in social services” (Williams 2017, 12). The variety of 
their approaches was high – “from those refusing the very idea of measuring 
[…] up to those speculating about the use of big data and artificial intelligence” 
(Bengo and Caloni 2015) – and generated significant tensions among the dif-
ferent actors for being recognized as legitimate experts in the field (Depedri 
2017). More specifically, six institutions were, and still are, at the core of the 
Italian impact economy and notably none of them belongs to the network of 
expertise that dominated the rising phase of the welfare mix, which institutions, 
individual consultants, and technical tools have found no space in the post-
2014 debate on social impact measurement. On the contrary, the landscape is 
dominated by two other networks5: on the one hand, the network developed 
during the 1990s through the alliance between some academic departments of 
Economics and the non-profit sector (see 1.1 and 1.2). In this phase, the alli-
ance with urban plannners that characterised the preceeding phase become less 
important and this expertise strongly advocates for a quantitative-qualitative 
method-mix primarily aiming at enhancing NPOs’ accountability towards the 
public administrations and the local communities.6 Measurement tools fit for 
 
5  These networks are articulated and complex: a closer analysis; which goes beyond the scope 
of the present article, would reveal important tensions within each of them.  
6  Euricse (University of Trento) <www.euricse.eu>; Aiccon (University of Bologna) <http:// 
www.aiccon.it>.  
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both social reporting and impact measurement have been developed and exper-
imented and formed an important non-human actor of this network (Zamagni et 
al. 2015; Depedri 2017). On the other hand, a more recent network emerged 
that developed from 2014 onwards, largely coincident with the coalition that 
founded Social Impact Agenda for Italy. Within this network, four institutions 
deserve special attention: two recently founded private foundations,7 a recently-
founded academic research lab focused on social innovation and SII,8 and a 
research center based in a prominent private university since the 1990s special-
ised in corporate social responsibility.9 In the years 2015-2017, these actors 
built a new network of expertise, promoting the “disruptive innovation” of the 
non-profit sector (Calderini and Chiodo 2014).10 More specifically, this net-
work is characterised by the promotion of metrics expressing synthetic and 
easily convertible indexes of social impact, such as SROI (Fondazione Sacra 
Famiglia 2017), or fit to the experimentation of mainstream pay-by-result pro-
grams, such as the counterfactual evaluation schemes that were elaborated for 
the feasibility study for the first Social Impact Bond in Italy (Fondazione 
Sviluppo e Crescita CRT, Human Foundation 2016).11  
The commission indeed started its work in this articulated scenario and was 
formed by 34 members “representing the different vital worlds of the non-
profit sector: social cooperatives, second level organizations, voluntary organi-
zations, foundations” (Chair of the Commission, Interview, March 2018). Re-
searchers from a number of research and consulting centers from both the 
above-mentioned networks participated in it. In forming the commission, the 
Government recognized indeed a leading to the network of expertise embedded 
into the non-profit sector, as it is clear from the fact that the chair of the com-
mission was the scientific director of one of its two major research centers.12 
After one year of work, the Commission elaborated the guidelines of a new 
impact measurement tool, named VIS (Valutazione Impatto Sociale, i.e., Social 
 
7   Human Foundation, <www.humanfoundation.it>; and Lang Foundation, <www.fondazione 
langitalia.it>.  
8  Tiresia Lab (Politecnico di Milano), <www.tiresia.polimi.it>. 
9  Altis (Università Cattolica di Milano), <https://altis.unicatt.it>. 
10  In December 2015, this network formed the Italian section of the international association 
Social Value, with the aim to “promote the culture and the practice of social value among 
major public, business, and non-profit actors in Italy” (<http://www.socialvalueitalia.it/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/Kit_SvIta_2018_rev030518.pdf>). 
11  The first Italian SIB has been planned in the field of re-offending prevention. However, two 
years after the release of the feasibility study, it has not been implemented yet and no clear 
information is available on its advancement at the moment of writing. 
12  In 2010, as president of the National Agency for Non Profit (an agency depending from the 
Prime Minister Cabinet Office), the chair commissioned to ALTIS (see above) the elaboration 
of the Guidelines for non-profit Social Reporting, the major existing framework for non-
profits social reporting (Agenzia per le Onlus 2010). In March 2019 he was appointed Dean 
of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences. 
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Impact Evaluation), and proposed it to the government, which finally adopted it 
in July 2019 (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali 2019).  
According to VIS guidelines, VIS will be mandatory only to “the organiza-
tions competing for public bids at the national and international level, which 
are generally already required to deliver social impact evaluations” (Zamagni 
2018).  
Furthermore, VIS is a tool for self-evaluation rather than a way of imposing 
external and standardized metrics on NPOs: according to several statements by 
the chair of the commission, the “metrics will be chosen by the organizations in 
order to be consistent with the goals it pursues” (Zamagni 2018). As the chair 
of the Commission puts it:  
We had many meetings and I was chairing them [...] by the end of the process 
we reached a dialectic consensus. The main divide was between those advo-
cating for the evaluation and those against it [...] and then there were different 
views on how to get to the metrics. And we agreed on not imposing a single 
metrics. There was people pushing for the adoption of the SROI, others advo-
cating for the counterfactual [...] But that is not possible. Such metrics cannot 
be used by all the organizations. (Interview, March 2018) 
The model of evaluation advanced in the VIS is therefore at odds with the 
model of impersonal, standardized, and top-down model of expert-client rela-
tion that ideally characterized the combination of evidence-based policy mak-
ing with pay-by result schemes (see 2.1). Rather, it echoes the hegemonic mod-
el elaborated in the 1990s employed by NPOs for the sake of bottom-up, 
processual learning-by-experience (see 1.1). With regard to the funding circuits 
it allows to access, VIS is presented by the commission as a tool for communi-
ty accountability, fundraising, and for bettering the access of NPOs to loans 
from the banks: 
A: Here, measurement comes first, I mean it comes before the relation with fi-
nancial institutions. Let me explain: If I am a bank and you come and ask for 
credit, together with financial and legal informations, I will ask you your VIS 
too. 
Q: So, VIS may have consequences in the sector of credit, not in terms of at-
traction of investments. 
A: That’s all about access to credit. If you talk about Social Impact Invest-
ment, you go beyond the non-profit sector, you include capitalist enterprises 
too – but that was not our case. That’s a completely different discourse, we 
did not focus on that. Not at all! (ibid.) 
VIS is therefore a tool allowing banking institutions to include NPOs’ “social 
impact” in their credit policy (positive screening), rather than a tool for the 
implementation of pay-by-result schemes. 
As the Chair of the commission stated, contrasting views and interests re-
garding impact measurement emerged. Two different points of view on the de-
centralised and self-managed nature of VIS help making sense of this diversity 
and of the tensions it engendered. According to the chair of the commission, 
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the new metrics provokes the non-profits to reach a deeper understanding of 
their activity: 
Many discuss about the problem of the metrics but it is a false problem. The 
problem does not exist. Our text states clearly that every non-profit organiza-
tion must create its own metrics. It does not impose a single one. Organiza-
tions are forced to evaluate and report their social impact, but they have the 
freedom to decide how to do it. […] It was deliberate, my message to the or-
ganizations is: you have to work hard and think well. You have to study! Not 
just follow somebody else’s metrics. (Interview, March 2018) 
A different point of view is expressed by another participant to the commis-
sion. Academic professor of Social Innovation and prominent economic con-
sultant at the national level, he has been a member of the Italian advisory board 
at the G8 task force before and was promoted Social Impact Agenda for Italy 
later. As a leading figure of the network of expertise that emerged after the 
launch of the G8 task force, he stresses the distance between VIS and what is 
required by a rigorous SII strategy. The “dialectic consensus” reached by the 
commission according to its chair, in his words is nothing but the result of the 
defensive reaction of the Italian non-profit sector facing the challenge of SII. 
Oh, the commission [...] it ended up really bad. It was impossible to get to 
some strong recommendation. There were opposite visions and what came out 
is more or less nothing. The non-profit was opposing the idea and its re-
sistance won, but I think that was a big mistake because, you know [...] when 
you have social impact investors coming in and you have to bargain with a big 
bank over social impact metrics, the big bank can easily invest a hundred 
thousand Euros in a consultancy for imposing its perspective, while I don’t 
think it is the case for a non-profit. (Consultant, Interview, April 2018) 
It is not possible to develop further and discuss in detail the different positions, 
nor is it the aim here to take a position about what perspective is preferable or 
more realistic. Nonetheless, the consultant brings the attention to two important 
elements: first, the ability of the network of expertise rooted in the non-profit 
sector to impose its view and interest by elaborating metrics that seem to slow 
the speed of the “disruptive innovation” for which the emerging network rooted 
in the financial sector was pushing. Second, the fact that the existing diversity 
of social impact metrics will not end, despite the efforts to establish one nation-
al measurement tool such as VIS. The diversity and fragmentation of metrics 
will pose new challenges to the networks of welfare expertise. The elaboration 
of VIS has been an important step in the confrontation between different net-
works of expertise, but new steps are to be expected in the next years as new 
SII experiments are likely to be promoted by the Social Impact Agenda for 
Italy that will include the formulation of new impact metrics.  
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4. Conclusion 
The article contributes to the debate on the role of expertise in the transfor-
mation of the welfare state under three respects. First, it accounts for the histor-
ical trajectory that created the ecosystem in which an expertise promoting the 
financialization of welfare could develop. More specifically, it shows that the 
cuts to public welfare have destabilised the structure of the welfare mix and 
entailed, since 2008, tensions and transformations in the field of welfare exper-
tise. The crisis of the welfare mix, based on the combination of quasi-market 
and participatory social planning, created the space for the emergence of a new 
network of expertise that contested the one developed in the previous 20 years. 
This contestation developed with regards to funding mechanisms and models of 
expertise: the hybridazation of NPOs and the development of a more authorita-
tive model of consulting emerged as key tasks for welfare actors. In this con-
text, following the work of the G8 task force on SII in 2014, a third network of 
expertise, with strong ties with the financial industry, emerged and advocated 
for a new, financialized approach to social policies in the name of the attractivi-
ty for investors of social programs and social organizations. Therefore, the 
development of new social impact metrics has become a major task of Italian 
welfare expertise, encouraged by two important policy initiatives such as the 
G8 task force and the national reform of the non-profit sector. 
Second, it accounts for the contradictory and conflictual processes that lie 
beyond the establishment of technical tools and metrics, before their black-
boxing. Through the analysis of the work of the commission appointed by the 
government for the elaboration of shared metrics for measuring the social im-
pact of non-profit organizations, the article shows a two-fold, contradictory 
process. On the one hand, establishing shared metrics for social impact meas-
urement has become a shared goal of both the non-profit-based and the finance-
based networks of expertise; on the other hand, these networks of expertise 
elaborated and advanced very different social impact metrics. This confronta-
tion ended with the failure of the attempt to establish social impact metrics fit 
for the experimentation of SII programs. Instead, a more limited reporting 
system inspired by the welfare mix has been released by the commission, 
which interpreted social impact measurement as a form of self-evaluation on 
behalf of non-profit organizations. The analysis of social impact measurement 
expertise in-the-making (Eyal 2013), in this case, allows to account for the 
social, contested, and contradictory processes of construction of the measures.  
Third, the article confirms the tendency of social impact investing to pro-
duce a fragmented landscape of metrics, each linked to specific funding circuits 
and networks of expertise (Barman 2016; Chiapello and Godefroy 2017).  
In the context of increasing financialization of Italian welfare (Caselli and 
Dagnes 2018), this analysis contributes to an understanding of both the im-
portance of expertise and metrics in forging processes of financialization and 
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the contested and contradictory processes that lie beyond the establishment of 
expert knowledge and techniques. 
References 
Agenzia per le Onlus. 2010. Linee guida per la redazione del bilancio sociale delle 
organizzazioni Non Profit. Roma: Agenzia per le Onlus. 
Ascoli, Ugo, and Emanuele Pavolini. 2015. The Italian welfare state in a European 
perspective. Bristol: Policy Press. 
Ascoli, Ugo, and Costanzo Ranci, eds. 2002, Dilemmas of Welfare Mix. The new 
structure of welfare in an era of privatization. Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer-
Verlag. 
Barbetta, Giampaolo. 2013. Le Fondazioni. Il motore finanziario del terzo settore. 
Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Barman, Emily. 2015. Of principle and principal. Value plurality in the market of 
impact investing. Valuation Studies 3: 9-44. 
Barman, Emily. 2016. Caring capitalism. The meaning and measure of social 
value. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bifulco, Lavinia. 2015. Il welfare locale. Processi e prospettive. Roma: Carocci. 
Bengo, Irene, and Debora Caloni. 2015. La finanza che include. Gli investimento a 
impatto sociale per una nuova economia. <http://www.socialimpactagenda.it/ 
mission/la-finanza-che-include/> (Accessed August 23, 2019). 
Bruni, Luigino, and Stefano Zamagni. 2017. Civil Economy. New York: Columbia 
University Press 
Burgalassi, Marco, and Eleonora Melchiorre. 2014. La morfologia del sistema 
locale di welfare. In La pratica del welfare locale. L’evoluzione degli interventi e 
le sfide per i Comuni, eds. Monia Giovannetti, Cristiano Gori, Luca Pacini. 
Sant’Arcangelo di Romagna: Maggioli. 
Busso, Sandro. 2015. What works. Efficacia e quantificazione nelle politiche sociali 
in trasformazione. Rivista Italiana di Sociologia LVI 3-4: 479-501. 
Calderini, Mario, and Veronica Chiodo. 2014. La finanza sociale. L’impatto sulla 
dinamica domanda-offerta. Impresa Sociale 4. <https://www.rivistaimpresaso 
ciale.it/rivista/articolo/la-finanza-sociale-l-impatto-sulla-dinamica-domanda-
offerta> (Accessed May 21, 2020). 
Caselli, Davide. 2016. Between the Invisible Hand and the Invisible Heart. Italian 
Welfare Restructuring and the Quest for a New Neoliberal Hegemony. 
Partecipazione e Conflitto 2: 387-413. 
Caselli, Davide, and Joselle Dagnes. 2018. Salvàti dalla finanza? Analisi empiriche 
e prospettive critiche sulla finanziarizzazione del welfare e del benessere. 
Autonomie locali e servizi sociali 2: 205-219. 
Caselli, Davide, and Federica Rucco. 2018. The financialization of welfare. Social 
Impact Investing, Philanthropic Foundations and new frontiers of capital 
accumulation. Quaderni di Sociologia 76: 57-80. 
Conferenza delle Regioni e delle Province Autonome. 2014. Le risorse finanziarie 
per le politiche sociali, vol. 3. <http://www.regioni.it/cms/file/Image/ 
HSR 45 (2020) 3  │  158 
SANITA/Dossier_V_III/III_VOLUME_FILE_COMPLETO_AGG_27072015.pd
f> (Accessed May 21, 2020). 
Cerri, Marco. 2003. Il Terzo Settore. Bari: Dedalo Editore. 
Chiapello, Eve. 2019. The work of financialization. In The making of finance, eds. 
Isabelle Chambost, Marc Lenglet and Yamina Tadjeddine. London: Routledge. 
Chiapello, Eve. 2017. La financiarisation des politiques publiques. Mondes en 
developpement 2 (178): 23-40. 
Chiapello, Eve. 2015. Financialization of valuation. Human Studies 38: 13-35. 
Chiapello, Eve, and Gaston Godefroy. 2017. The dual function of judgment 
devices. Why does the plurality of market classification matter? Historical Social 
Research 42 (1): 152-188. doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.1.152-188. 
Chiodo, Veronica, and Gerli Fprancesco. 2017. Domanda e offerta di capitale per 
l’impatto sociale: una lettura ecosistemica del mercato italiano. Rivista Impresa 
Sociale 10. <http://www.tiresia.polimi.it/uncategorized/domanda-e-offerta-di-
capitale-per-limpatto-sociale-una-lettura-ecosistemica-del-mercato-italiano/> 
(Accessed May 21, 2020). 
Cottino, Paolo, and Flaviano Zandonai. 2012. Progetti di impresa sociale come 
strategie di rigenerazione urbana: spazi e metodi per l’innovazione sociale. 
Euricse Working Paper 042/12. 
De Ambrogio, Ugo, and Giorgio Sordelli, eds. 2014. Metodi ed esperienze di 
valutazione nel sociale. Milano: Istituto per la Ricerca Sociale. 
De Ambrogio, Ugo, and Cecilia Guidetti. 2014. La coprogettazione tra potenzialità 
e illusioni. Prospettive Sociali e Sanitarie 1.2: 1-2.  
Depedri, Sara. 2017. La valutazione dell’impatto sociale nel terzo settore. Il 
posizionamento scientifico di Euricse e il metodo impACT. Euricse working 
papers. <https://www.euricse.eu/it/publications/la-valutazione-dellimpatto-socia 
le-nel-terzo-settore/> (Accessed August 23, 2019). 
Dowling, Emma, and David Harvie. 2014. Harnessing the social: State, Crisis and 
(Big) Society. Sociology 48 (5): 869-886. 
Epstein, Gerald A., ed. 2005. Financialization and the world economy. 
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.  
Euricse. 2010. La filosofia di Euricse. Per lo studio delle cooperative e delle 
imprese sociali. <www.euricse.eu>. 
European Commission. 2011. Creating a favourable climate for Social Enterprises, 
key stakeholders in the social economy and innovation. Brussels: European 
Comission. 
Evers, Adalbert. 1993. The welfare mix approach. Understanding the pluralism of 
welfare systems. In Balancing Pluralism. New Welfare Mixes in Care for the 
Elderly, eds. Evers, Adalbert and Ivan Svetlik. Avebury: Aldershot. 
Eyal, Gil. 2013. For a Sociology of Expertise: The Social Origins of the Autism 
Epidemic. American Journal of Sociology 118 (4): 863-907. 
Ferrera, Maurizio. 1996. Le politiche sociali. Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Fondazione Cariplo. 2017. Bandi 2017. Welfare di Comunità e Innovazione Sociale. 
<http://www.fondazionecariplo.it/static/upload/ban/0000/bando-welfare-in-azio 
ne-20171.pdf> (Accessed August 23, 2019). 
Fondazione Sacra Famiglia. 2017. Bilancio Sociale di missione 2016. 
<http://www.sacrafamiglia.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/bilancio_sacrafamig 
lia_2016.pdf> (Accessed August 23, 2019). 
HSR 45 (2020) 3  │  159 
Fondazione Sviluppo e Crescita CRT & Human Foundation. 2016. L’applicazione 
di strumenti pay-by-result per l’innovazione dei programmi di reinserimento 
sociale e lavorativo delle persone detenute. <www.humanfoundation.it> 
(Accessed August 23, 2019). 
Fosti, Giovanni. 2013. Rilanciare il welfare locale. Ipotesi e strumenti: una 
prospettiva di management delle reti. Milano: Egea 
G8 Task Force. 2014. Impact Investment. The invisible heart of markets. 
<http://gsgii.org/reports/impact-investment-the-invisible-heart-of-markets/> 
(Accessed August 23, 2019). 
Gori, Cristiano, Valentina Ghetti, Giselda Rusmini, and Rosemarie Tidoli. 2014. Il 
Welfare Sociale in Italia. Roma: Carocci. 
Gori, Cristiano. 2013. Postfazione. In Rilanciare il welfare locale. Ipotesi e 
strumenti: una prospettiva di management delle reti, ed. Giovanni Fosti, 209-
214. Milano: Egea 
Geiger, Susi, Debbie Harrison, Hans Kjellberg, and Alexandre Mallard, eds. 2014. 
Concerned markets. Economic ordering for multiple values. Cheltenam: Edward 
Elgar. 
Istat (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica). 2018. La povertà in Italia. <www.istat.it>  
Maino, Franca, and Maurizio Ferrera, eds. 2013. Primo Rapporto sul Secondo 
Welfare. <www.secondowelfare.it>. 
Marcon, Giulio. 2004. Le utopie del ben fare. Roma: L’ancora del Mediterraneo 
Martinelli, Flavia, Anneli Anttonen, and Margaritt Matzke, eds. 2017. Social 
Services Disrupted. Changes, challenges and policy implications for Europe in 
times of austerity. Cheltenam: Edward Elgar. 
Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali. 2019. Linee guida per la 
realizzazione di sistemi di valutazione dell’impatto sociale delle attività svolte 
dagli enti del Terzo Settore, ai sensi dell’art. 7 comma 3 della legge 6 giugno 
2016, 106. 
OECD/Wilson, K.E. 2014. New Investment Approaches for Addressing Social and 
Economic Challenges. OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers 
15. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
Osborne, Stephen. 2006. The new public governance? Public Management Review 
8 (3): 377-387. 
Pasi, Giulio, ed. 2017. Modelli di risposta ai nuovi bisogni sociali e possibili scenari 
di riforma. Roma: Social Impact Agenda per l’Italia. 
Pestoff, Victor, Taco Brandsen, and Bram Verschuere, eds. 2012. New Public 
Governance, the Third Sector and Co-Production. Routledge: London. 
Schein, Edgar. 1969. Process consultation. Its role in organizational development. 
Reading: Addison-Wesley Publications. 
Social Impact Agenda for Italy. 2016. Manifesto. <http://www.socialimpactagenda. 
it/mission/manifesto/> (Accessed August 23, 2019). 
Venturi, Paolo, and Flaviano Zandonai. 2014. Ibridi organizzativi. Bologna: Il 
Mulino. 
Williams, James. 2017. Capturing the “Invisible Heart of the Markets”. Social 
Impact Bonds, Private Capital, and Emerging Markets in Social Services. Paper 
Presented at the International Conference Social Finance, Impact Investing and 
the Financialization of Public Interest, 23-24 March, Hamburg University, 
Germany. 
HSR 45 (2020) 3  │  160 
Zamagni, Stefano. 2018. In arrivo le linee guida del governo. Vita 4: 29 
Zamagni, Stefano. 2017. Il terzo settore in transito. L’urgenza della normatività 
sociale. In Il terzo settore in transito. Normatività sociale ed economie coesive, 
eds. Venturi, Paolo, Sara Rago.. Bologna: AICCON. <www.aiccon.it>.  
Zamagni, Stefano, Paolo Venturi, and Sara Rago. 2015. Valutare l’impatto sociale. 
La questione della misurazione nelle imprese sociali. Rivista Impresa Sociale 6. 
 
Historical Social Research 
Historische Sozialforschung 
All articles published in HSR Special Issue 45 (2020) 3: 
Social Finance, Impact Investing, and the Financialization of the Public Interest. 
 
Eve Chiapello & Lisa Knoll 
Social Finance and Impact Investing. Governing Welfare in the Era of Financialization. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.45.2020.3.7-30 
Emily Barman 
Many a Slip: The Challenge of Impact as Boundary Object in Social Finance. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.45.2020.3.31-52 
Antoine Ducastel & Ward Anseeuw 
Impact Investing in South Africa: Investing in Empowerment, Empowering Investors. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.45.2020.3.53-73 
Serena Natile 
Digital Finance Inclusion and the Mobile Money “Social” Enterprise: A Socio-Legal Critique of M-Pesa in Kenya.  
doi: 10.12759/hsr.45.2020.3.74-94 
Jacob Hellman 
Feeling Good and Financing Impact: Affective Judgments as a Tool for Social Investing. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.45.2020.3.95-116 
Théo Bourgeron 




Did You Say “Social Impact”? Welfare Transformations, Networks of Expertise, and the Financialization of Italian Welfare.  
doi: 10.12759/hsr.45.2020.3.140-160 
Leslie Huckfield 
The Mythology of the Social Impact Bond. A Critical Assessment from a Concerned Observer. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.45.2020.3.161-183 
Manuel Wirth 
Nudging Subjects at Risk: Social Impact Bonds between Financialization and Compassion. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.45.2020.3.184-205 
For further information on our journal, including tables of contents, article abstracts, 
and our extensive online archive, please visit https://www.gesis.org/en/hsr. 
 
ist ri l i l s r  
i t ri  i lf r  
